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Perpetual Property
SARAH HARDING ∗

INTRODUCTION

Property interests, unlike contract, tend to adhere to a limited set of
specific forms – the numerus clausus principle. 1 This distinction has been
the subject of much scholarship in the past decade in an attempt to
understand both the nature of and the reasons for the limitation on property
forms that exist within the common law. 2 While these limitations on form
are both intriguing and central to the common law, equally significant are
the temporal limitations embedded in property law – property interests are
typically defined by and thus only defensible for a specific time period.
Even the fee simple, a property interest of supposedly infinite duration, is
Copyright © Sarah K. Harding
∗
Associate Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law. . This paper was primarily
written during a research fellowship at the Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University. I am grateful for the comments of my colleagues
and participants in workshops there and at Chicago-Kent, in particular Ian Ayres,
Katharine Baker, John Braithwaite, Jennifer Brown, Peter Cane, Peter Drahos,
Kevin Gray, Steve Heyman, Imelda Maher, Colin Scott, Jane Stapleton and
Adrienne Stone.
1
See Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2000)(“In the
common law, the principle that property rights must conform to certain
standardized forms has no name. In the civil law, which recognizes the doctrine
explicitly, it is called the numerus clausus--the number is closed.”)
2
See Merrill and Smith, supra. note 1; Henry Hansmann and Rainer Kraakman,
Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the
Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002); Michael Heller, The
Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163 (1999). Bernard Rudden,
Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem in OXFORD
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 239 (JOHN EEKELAAR & JOHN BELL eds., Third Series,
1987).
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limited in time by a number of overarching rules often referred to as “rules
furthering marketability.” 3
Like the numerus clausus principle, these temporal limitations have
been relatively tenacious, limiting the longevity and remote vesting of
property interests for much of the recent history of the common law of
property. The most infamous and controversial of these limitations is the
somewhat quizzical rule against perpetuities. But recently many of these
limitations have begun to disappear. In a number of discrete but significant
areas of property law, temporal limitations are being stretched beyond
recognition or are disappearing altogether giving rise to more enduring and
in some cases more fragmented property interests. So while limitations on
the forms of property interests remain relatively stable, limitations on the
duration of some property interests are disappearing giving rise to a
growing number of perpetual property interests.
This paper explores the emergence of perpetual property in a
number of discrete areas of property law: the longevity of servitudes in
historic and environmental protections, the ever growing time span of
intellectual property rights, and the disappearance of the rules against
perpetual interests. While the demise of these and other temporal
limitations is itself worthy of recognition and will be the focus of a major
part of this paper, my primary interest is whether these changes tell us
something about shifting cultural attitudes to the institution of private
property. If it is the case, as a number of prominent sociologists have
argued, that an exploration of social attitudes toward time is indispensable
to an understanding of our current cultural conditions then exploring
temporal limitations in property law will presumably help us better
understand what Professor Radin has called the “cultural commitments of
property.” 4 This topic is particularly compelling when one considers that
the emergence of perpetual property, with its embedded expectations of
stability and permanence, has occurred at a time when speed, flexibility and
impermanence are dominant features of our current social conditions. The
emergence of perpetual property within the larger experience of 21st
century living and “time-space compression” is nothing short of
paradoxical.
Section I of this paper begins with a brief exploration of time in
property, from the abstract theories that justify and delineate entitlements to
the concrete doctrines temporally constraining ownership interests. The
3

DUKEMINIER, KRIER, ALEXANDER, SCHILL, PROPERTY (6th ed, 2006).
Margaret J. Radin, Government Interests and Takings: Cultural Commitments of
Property and the Role of Political Theory, in REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 168
(1993).
4
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institution of private property, Carol Rose has argued, functions within the
expectations of “an agrarian or a commercial people – a people whose
activities with respect to the objects around them require an unequivocal
delineation of lasting control...” 5 The primary contention in this section is
that the temporal realities in the institution of private property are essential
to the broader social expectations and conditions inherent in such a society.
Section II addresses the changes in property law affecting temporal
limitations, beginning with those concerning the control of property in the
distant future. Here the two most notable changes are the slow
disappearance of the rule against perpetuities and the rise of perpetual
servitudes in the areas of environmental conservation and historic
preservation. In addition this section will look briefly at the increasing
longevity of intellectual property rights. The second half explores the
reclamation of property from the past, in particular the meteoric rise in both
the number and success of repatriation claims. Most of the changes
discussed in this paper are based in U.S. law, but I also draw on material
from other common law jurisdictions with the expectation of making at
least tentative claims about shifts in the cultural significance of private
property within common law systems.
Section III discusses some plausible explanations for the
emergence of perpetual property. It is important to note that there are a
variety of diverse and complex first order explanations for the changes
discussed in this paper, explanations that may have little to do with the
temporal limitations themselves. For example the disappearance of the rule
against perpetuities may be the consequence of changes to the tax code and
the increasing length of copyright the result of a powerful entertainment
industry lobby. And yet in each area the temporal changes are intentional
and significant. Collectively they pose a phenomenon worth exploring
particularly given the common law’s traditional abhorrence of perpetual
property interests. Furthermore, it may be the case that considering these
changes collectively reveals important underlying shared characteristics
justifying the proposition of an emerging category in which our collective
yearnings for stability in a rapidly changing world manifest themselves in a
desire for longer lasting interests. In the final analysis I argue that it is this
increasing collective desire for permanence, for a slowing of time in some
select areas, not the fundamental and absolute nature of property rights as

5

Carol Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHICAGO L.R. 73, 87
(1985).
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others have argued, 6 that helps explain the emergence of perpetual
interests.
I. TIME AND PROPERTY
A. General Conceptions of Time in Law
At the most abstract of levels the law operates within specific
conceptions of time. It is legitimated as much through its temporal
representations as through its spatial or territorial limitations – it is both
here and now. But just as our cultural conceptions of time are complicated
and contradictory, dependent on both linear and cyclical representations, so
law partakes of such indeterminancies. The “now” is both the present and
all times, at once specific and general.
In her insightful discussion of conceptions of time in the operation
of law, Carol Greenhouse argues that the common law simultaneously
draws on two conceptions of time. On the one hand it “reflects perfectly a
logic of linear time.” 7 It depends on past articulations through the doctrine
of precedent not merely as substantively persuasive legal ideas but as
statements that have the benefit of time itself. Common law courts depend
on a “pervasive traditionality” 8 in decision-making - the past is relevant
“for its own sake.” 9 The circularity of this is countered by the linear
conception of reform. While constantly embedding itself in the past, law
also expresses itself as an engine of reform and progress. Law as reform or
as a constantly improving set of ideas has been a particularly pervasive
view since the great reformers of the late 18th c. – Bentham and Mill. In this

6

See, e.g. Richard Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law
of Property, 64 WASHINGTON U. L.Q. 667, 795 (1986).
7
Carol J. Greenhouse, Just in Time: Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation of
Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1631, 1640 (1989)(The reception of linear time in the West
was, Greenhouse writes, the product of Christianity but was secularized in
medieval times)..
8
Martin Krygier, Critical Legal Studies and Social Theory, 7 OXFORD J. OF LEG.
ST. 26 (1987).
9
Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition 99 YALE L.J. 1029
(1990)(exploring the importance of the principle of stare decisis and a more
general respect for the past not in terms of utilitarian or deontological
considerations but as a pervasive and intrinsic feature of culture: “It is only on that
condition--on the basis of a traditionalism which honors the past for its own sake-that the world of culture can be sustained.” 1068)
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way law and the legal resolution of disputes strings together the past,
present and future thus perfecting representations of linear time.
But, Greenhouse argues, “the common law also involves larger
claims beyond linear time.” While its linear presentation and its
dependence on the possibility of change suggest incompleteness, at any
given moment the common law “represents a totality.” Greenhouse writes:
It is by definition complete, yet its
completeness does not preclude change. It is a
human achievement, yet by its reversible and
lateral excursions, and by its collective voice,
it is not identifiably the product of any
particular individual or group. Symbolically,
it stands at the border between the two great
zones of Indo-European thinking – the humanmade … and the divine …- and is nourished
by the indeterminacy of the distinction
between events in linear time and possibilities
(all-times). 10
It is the representation of these two conceptions of time that,
Greenhouse argues, generates the mythic dimension of law and as such sets
it apart from other dispute-focused, norm-creating institutions. By being
both “in time” and “out of time” the law is capable of sustaining its
mythical status and its connected claims to neutrality.
First year law students in common law systems know this tension
very well, even if it is rarely acknowledged. They learn in the first weeks of
their legal studies the notion of precedent and stare decisis; the importance
of rationalizing legal opinions by resorting to past decisions, the more
prominent the better. But students are also conditioned to present legal
solutions as being “out of time,” as part of a continuous whole that has, for
the most part, always been as it is. Constancy, not change, is the
foundation of persuasive legal arguments. The curious timeless nature of
the common law, its mythical status, is also captured in the declaratory
theory - the idea that judges only find and declare the common law, merely
identifying its true nature, rather than making it up as they go along. While
a strong version of the declaratory theory may be out of fashion among
legal thinkers and judges, the notion that law pre-exists judicial decisionmaking still has a place in the common law. 11

10
11

Greenhouse, supra. note 7 at 1640.
Richard Tur, Time and Law 22 OXFORD J. OF LEG. ST. 463, 471 (2002).
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Greenhouse was writing broadly about the common law and its
legitimation rather than specific substantive areas within the law. But we
can borrow her notion of the temporalities of the law to explore specific
substantive areas. If, as Greenhouse writes, the law engages specific
temporal logics as a means of legitimating itself within the larger culture do
specific areas of law represent their subject matter within a conception of
time?
B. Time and Property
Property as a subset of the common law is dependent on these
broad and competing conceptions of time but additionally it produces and
depends upon specific temporal representations of property itself. So just
as “law – as an idea – carries cultural force because it engages [certain]
temporalities” 12 so property law engages specific temporalities as relevant
to its subject matter. At the most abstract level, Carol Rose notes that,
contrary to expectations, traditional theorizing about property almost
inevitably takes “a striking turn toward a narrative or diachronic
explanatory mode where … time and cumulative experience play essential
roles.” 13 In such accounts, property as an institution is explicable only
through a series of events emerging over time – a story in Rose’s
terminology - rather than as an analytically derived system whose separate
parts are immediately discernible and predictable.
If Rose is right, we can see how theorizing about property has
relied on the same cultural expectation of linearity that Greenhouse
suggests is embedded in the common law broadly speaking; essential to a
diachronic explanation of the institution of private property is an
assumption of progress over time. But equally apparent in Rose’s analysis
of the structure of property theories is the “out of time” element. While
many of the most important figures in the history of property theory must
rely on stories to arrive at an explanation for property rights, the rights
themselves are presented as being self-ordained - or natural. Locke’s theory
of entitlements, for example, depends on a series of connected assumptions
about the self and the products of individual effort 14 and in this sense
emerges like a moral from a cautionary tale. On the other hand, Margaret
Jane Radin has noted that “the temporal dimension is irrelevant to the
Lockean theory of property” in that it concerns itself with only the precise
12

Greenhouse, supra. note 7 at 1650.
CAROL ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 26 (1994).
14
John Locke, Second Treatise of Government § 25, in TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 327 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1960) (1st ed. London 1690).
13
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moment of acquisition, ignoring the larger “temporal dimension of human
affairs.” 15 Both of these observations ring true and are not contradictory but
rather reinforce Rose’s suggestion that while traditional property theories
tend to rationalize property as a self-evident and timeless institution, they
very much depend on “time and cumulative experience.” So property
theory can be seen as an instance of law’s broader mythic dimension – both
embedded in the constant flux and change of society while simultaneously
presenting itself as unchanging and existing for all times.
If we move from the structures of property theories to the theories
and doctrines themselves, the relevance of time to property becomes even
more apparent. Certainly one of the most ubiquitous concepts in the
establishment of property rights is “first in time” – the first person to
possess the property in question has priority over all others. 16 Robert
Sugden argues that “first in time” is one of the primary conventions in both
formal and informal justifications of private property. 17 To this we can add
the idea of intent of “lasting control” 18 as another central feature of theories
about successful ownership claims. While these concepts are complicated
by difficulties in ascertaining what constitutes firstness or control, the
person “first in time” with the intent to exercise “lasting control” in ways
that are clearly recognizable by others is nonetheless more likely to
succeed. As with the importance of diachronic explanations for the
development of private property, the ubiquity of first in time theories
reinforces the importance of linearity in the creation of cognizable property
rights.
At the doctrinal level property law utilizes culturally determined
time frames to create, limit and destroy property interests. While the central
concept in the common law of property, the fee simple, is defined as a
temporally unbounded interest, all lesser estates are defined by precise time
limitations – a life, 99 years, a month etc. 19 The fee simple, an interest of
15

Margaret Jane Radin Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 739,
739-40 (1986).
16
See Richard A. Epstein , Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law
of Property 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 669-74 (1986)(detailing the importance of the
first in time or “first come, first served” principle in property law).
17
ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, COOPERATION AND WELFARE 8797 (1986).
18
See Rose, Possession, supra. note 5 at 87 (“the common law of first possession
… requires an unequivocal delineation of lasting control so that those objects can
be either managed or traded.”)
19
2 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 103(“First, with regard to the quantity of
interest which the tenant has in the tenement, this is measured by it's duration and
extent. Thus, either his right of possession is to subsist for an uncertain period,
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“potentially infinite duration” 20 fits well with and no doubt even
encourages a belief in absolute, unfettered property interests, despite the
fact it too is subject to temporal constraints. It reinforces Greenhouse’s
observation, that law and legal interests are represented as being both “in
time” and “out of time.” An absolute right of infinite duration is “out of
time,” lacking clear temporal definition, but just as the notion of absolute
ownership is a misconception or a myth 21 so too the idea of perpetual
ownership has never been accurate. In other words while an intent of
“lasting control” might be important in establishing property rights, real
control over too long a period of time can in fact be used to quash those
very same interests. Arguably this is the whole point of the various “rules
furthering marketablity.” 22
There are numerous ways the common law limits property
interests to a specified time period in order to maintain clarity in ownership
and free alienability. The most infamous and direct of these temporal
constraints is the rule against perpetuities, discussed in greater detail below.
Legislatures have also imposed time limitations predominantly through
statutes of limitations. These temporal restraints effectively terminate some
property interests while recognizing others based on little more than the
passage of time. 23 They can be generic, as is the case with legislation
regarding adverse possession, or specific, for example marketable title acts

during his own life, or the life of another man; to determine at his own decease, or
to remain to his descendants after him: or it is circumscribed within a certain
number of years, month, or days: or, lastly, it is infinite and unlimited, being
vested in him and his representatives for ever.”)
20
HERBERT HOVENKAMP & SHELDON KURTZ, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 94 (5TH ed.
2001).
21
See LAURA UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY 2 (2003)(“The idea that
property rights – particularly those involving land – are presumptively free from
collective claims has been decisively abandoned, if ever it was true.”); Kevin Gray
and Susan Gray, Private Property and Public Propriety in PROPERTY AND
CONSTITUTIONS 11, 15 (Janet McLean ed., 1999)(“The ideology of property as
uncontrolled exclusory power is nowadays just as untenable as is the dichotomous
distinction between the domains of the private and the public.”)
22
See Dukeminier and Krier, supra. note 4 at.
23
While adverse possession has many elements, the most unwavering is the simple
passage of time. For a discussion of the many justifications for adverse possession,
many of which hinge on the passage of time, See Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy
Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO.L.J. 2419 (2001)(ultimately isolating the
endowment effect or loss-aversion theory as the most plausible justification for
adverse possession).
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terminating stale claims 24 or limitations on the duration of certain
defeasible interests. 25
C. Time and Boundaries
Property as a temporally bounded notion fits comfortably with the
many other ways in which property law depends on boundaries. The most
significant limiting factor or “boundary” in property is the limited number
of carefully defined interests that are cognizable and enforceable as
property interests – the numerous clauses principle. 26 According to
Michael Heller, private property is circumscribed by a host of rules that
attempt to protect against inefficient arrangements, predominantly
commons (“overlapping rights of use in a commons”) and anti-commons
(“too many rights of exclusions.”) 27 Heller argues that although the
various metaphors for conceptualising property, particularly the physical
thing and the bundle of rights metaphors, have generally obscured the
“nuanced way law enforces property boundaries,” such conceptual
boundaries have been pivotal to the ongoing vitality of private property. 28
Rules that limit “inter-temporal fragmentation,” such as the rule against
perpetuities, are according to Heller, key examples of such efficiencyproducing boundaries. 29
While Professor Heller and others firmly ground their observations
concerning the numerus clausus in an efficiency framework, 30 specifically
the role of law in protecting and encouraging the productive use of
24

See, e.g. The Uniform Marketable Title Act (1990)(“The Model Act is designed
to assure a title searcher who has found a chain of title starting with a document at
least 30 years old that he need search no further back in the record.”)
25
See, e.g. 765 ILCS 330/4 (limiting possibilities of reverter and rights of entry or
re-entry to 40 years.)
26
See Merrill and Smith, supra. note 1.
27
Michael Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1195
(1999)
28
Id. at 1187-1194.
29
Id. at 1176-1182. But see Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property
Theory: The Numerus Clausus Problem, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
Third Series 239 (John Eekelaar and John Bell eds., 1987)(questioning efficiency
based justifications for the standardization of property interests).
30
Heller focuses on antifragmentation as the key efficiency aspect of the numerus
clausus, but Merrill and Smith focus on the standardization /efficiency function,
Merrill and Smith supra. note 1; and Hansmann and Kraakman, also writing in
this area focus on the verification/efficiency function, Hansmann and Kraakman,
supra note 2.
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resources, other accounts of the core of private property recognize the
relevance of boundaries in a broader social, cultural context. At a very
basic level, Professor Rose argues that physical boundaries, such as the
dilapidated fence that graces the cover of her collection of essays, are
essential to the declaration, “This is mine.” 31 But additional acts
expressing a clear and unequivocal intent to exclude others are necessary to
turn such physical boundaries into enforceable legal boundaries. The
success of ownership claims depends on actions that both delimit one’s
interest and are easily understood by others. The spatial and temporal
contexts for such actions are key delimiting factors that either support or
contradict ownership claims given certain cultural and societal
expectations. So, As Carol Rose argues, complete and successful claims to
ownership depend at least partially on actions that evidence an intention of
long term commitment rather than a temporary or itinerant interest, at least
within the agrarian/commercial societies from which our system of private
property evolved. 32
The point of this is to stress that the timing of our actions with
respect to property is important in determining the validity and extent of
property rights. In addition, how we judge such timing is a product of
specific cultural and societal expectations. A hands-off itinerant form of
occupation and use might be the basis of a cognizable and thus successful
claim to property in some societies, but it is unlikely to support an
ownership claim in traditional common law societies given their
agricultural and commercial moorings. 33 While claims that look too
uncertain or evince a lack of commitment are shunned in the common law,
so too are claims that appear to extend beyond the reasonable limitations of
individual control. In short, built into our system of private property is the
expectation that owners will be in control of and committed to their
property as appropriate but not beyond that which is useful in a commercial
society.
If we look at this specifically through the lens of time rather than
through the demands of commerce, the traditional common law regulation
of property is well-suited to the “sheer pace of change” associated with
31

Carol Rose, Property and Persuasion: Essays on the History, Theory and
Rhetoric of Ownership, 1 (1994).
32
Rose, Possession, supra. note 5 at 87.
33
Stuart Banner, in his discussion of property law and the colonization of
Australia, notes that “In the late eighteenth century, may believed that a society
without agriculture was therefore a society without property rights in land.” Stuart
Banner, Why Terra Nullius? Anthropologhy and Property Law in Early Australia,
23 LAW AND HISTORY REV. 95 (2005).
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modern society. 34 It privileges rules that encourage and enable flexibility
and a quick response to changing circumstances. In short, given the pace of
change, it would be irrational to allow individuals to retain interest in
property well into the future under circumstances that are beyond our
ability to predict.
Thus temporal limitations can be understood and justified based on
the centrality of property to the development of commerce and the general
experience of time in modern society. Clear boundaries both temporal and
spatial are key to a system of property rights. How then should we
understand the erosion of these temporal limitations? If temporal
limitations in property are changing does this reflect changing assumptions
about the role of property in our society? Property law has traditionally
engaged specific temporal logics that are decipherable and thus persuasive
within a commercial/agrarian society. If these temporal logics are shifting
can we take this as an indication of a larger cultural/societal shift in
expectations about our relationship with property – or at least with respect
to some forms of property?
The following section looks at a number of doctrinal changes in
property law that permit private property holders to control their property
further into the future or alternatively to claim property from the distant
past. All of these changes suggest a shift in our expectations about the
legitimate temporalities of private property, at least in certain discrete areas
of property law.

II. THE FUTURE AND THE PAST IN OUR PRESENT CONCEPTION OF
PROPERTY
A.

Reaching into the Future

The changes discussed below cover three doctrinal areas of
property law. The first two are part of the traditional body of property law
– the rule against perpetuities and servitudes. Changes in both of these
areas permit interested property holders to retain control over their property
perpetually, even though traditionally the common law guarded against this
outcome. The third change comes from intellectual property law. Here the
lengthening terms of intellectual property rights, in particular copyright,
raise independent questions and problems while nonetheless sharing the
same temporal peculiarities as the other examples.

34

ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 6 (1990)
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1. The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities
Ask any law student what their most unpleasant classroom
experience was and chances are that a significant percentage will point to
the Rule Against Perpetuities (“the rule”). With its awkward method of
time measurement that simultaneously depends on concrete and abstract
concepts, students generally don’t get it. Its focus on irrational possibilities
- fertile octogenarians and unborn widows - rather than circumstances in
real life has earned it the reputation as a trap for estate planners, 35
confounding the plans of those who wish to control their property well into
the future. But peculiar as it may be it has been around for over 400 years
and is one of the classic rules of the common law.
The “modern” rule is typically traced back to the Duke of Norfolk’s
Case, 36 in which Lord Nottingham held an estate to be valid so long as it
vested, if at all, during the lifetime of a person now alive. From there the
rule eventually became “No interest is valid unless it must vest, if at all, not
later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest.” 37 On the assumption that those who know the rule need no
further explanation and those who do not want no further explanation, I
will not elaborate on the workings of the rule. 38
The rule was crafted to prevent landowners from controlling their
property too far into the future. 39 While land was the primary focus of the
rule, it came to encompass all interests, real or personal, legal or
equitable. 40 The purpose of the rule is relatively settled: it limits “dead
35

The Irish Law Reform Commission Report on the question of the abolition of
the rule suggests that the Rule acts as a “legal nuisance.” Report on the Rule
Against Perpetuities and Cognate Rules (LRC 62-2000) at 52. The difficulties
associated with the RAP are captured in the title of Barton Leach’s article,
Perpetuities: Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents, (1952) 68 LQR 35 (1952).
36
(1685) 1 Vern 164.
37
JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 174 § 201 (3rd ed.
1915).
38
For further discussion of the rule and its many trappings (literally) the classic
text is GRAY, supra. note 37.
39
But see, A.W.B. SIMPSON, LANDOWNERSHIP AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM 37
(1999)(arguing that the primary function of the rule was not to limit the interests of
powerful landholders desiring to tie up their property for generations but rather to
ensure a legal mechanism for doing so.)
40
See, The Law Commission, The Rules Against Perpetuities and Excessive
Accumulations §1.11. The Duke of Norfolk’s case was itself about a leasehold, an
interest traditionally considered more personal than real property.
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hand” control of property. It affects a balance between the interests of
current generations and future generations; it “strikes a balance between the
wishes of the dead and the desires of the living with respect to the use of
wealth.” 41 The justifications for this limitation or balance are frequently
voiced in economic terms. Along with a collection of other limiting rules,
the rule against perpetuities came to embody the common law’s support of
the free alienability of property or, in modern parlance, the free market.
Judge Posner, for example, states:
Not only are arrangements for the distant
future likely to result in an inefficient use of
resources brought about by unforseen
contingencies; interests that do not vest till
sometime in the distant future may be owned
by persons as yet unascertained or even
unborn making it difficult or impossible to
obtain consent to a transfer. 42
More recently, Professor Michael Heller states, “the [rule]
conclusively presumes a point after which the social cost of fragmentation
exceeds private gains.” 43 While the marketability gains achieved through
the rule may both justify and explain its resilience in the common law,
many have observed that this fails to justify its application to trusts. Stewart
Sterk states: “So long as the trustee has power to sell whatever land is held
in trust (or whatever other assets the trust holds), concerns about
marketability disappear.” 44
The balance achieved through the rule is also justified in nonefficiency terms. For example a recent UK Law Commission Report
emphasized fairness to future generations rather than efficiency as the
primary basis for retaining the rule, albeit in a reduced and reformed
state. 45 This fairness justification is particularly relevant in the application
41

ROBERT J. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 10 (1966). See
also T.P. Gallanis, The Rule Against Perpetuities and the Law Commission’s
Flawed Philosophy 59(2) CAMBRIDGE L.J. 284, 284-285 (2000).
42
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 560 (5th ed. 1998); Lord Coke,
writing in the late sixteenth century might have been the first to articulate an
efficiency related justification for such limiting rules, emphasizing the need for
property to be freely alienable. SEE WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH. III A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 85 (2nd ed.)
43
Heller, supra. note 2 at 1180.
44
Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the RAP, 24 CARDOZO L.REV. 2097, 2109 (2003).
45
Law Commission Report 251, The Rule Against Perpetuities and Excessive
Accumulations (1998).
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of the rule to interests created in beneficiaries under a trust given that
concerns about the free alienability of property are simply no longer
relevant. 46
Despite its long and infamous career in the common law, it looks
like the rule is finally on its way out. Legislative alterations to the
operation of the rule have slowly worn down its sharp edges, 47 most
significantly altering the peculiar way in which the rule turns on remote
possibilities by initiating a “wait and see” approach 48 or simply changing
the perpetuity term to a fixed eighty or ninety years. 49 The Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, for example, provides that a nonvested property interest will remain valid so long as it actually either vests
or terminates within ninety years. 50 Most of these changes soften the rule
thus allowing more settlements to remain intact. But now many
jurisdictions are abolishing it all together. 51 In an essay entitled The Death
of the Rule Against Perpetuities, Or the RAP has no Friends, Joel Dobris
comments that “society does not seem to care anymore about

46

HAROLD ARTHUR JOHN FORD AND WILLIAM ANTHONY LEE, PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF TRUSTS § 7270 (3rd 1996); But see Sterk, supra. note 44 at 2110 (arguing
that even the fairness justification doesn’t work well when dealing with equitable
interests held in trust but he goes on to argue that the RAP does function to
prevent the creation of trusts that would “generate agency costs and externalities
without generating commensurate benefits.” Id. 2111-17)
47
Legislation in the State of Illinois provides a good example of the types of
changes that have been enacted. Legislation in that jurisdiction has been enacted to
deal with the problems of the “fertile octogenarian,” the “unborn widow,” and
interests created in individuals who must comply with an age restriction beyond 21
and more generally has limited the harsh application of the rule by implementing a
“wait and see” approach. 765 ILCS 305(4)(c).
48
See, e.g., Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities Act (1990) s. 1(a)(2). For
a full list of the states that have adopted this approach, see Jesse Dukeminier &
James Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust 50 UCLA L.R. 1303, 1305-1307
(2003).
49
Id. See also R..POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §§ 71.02[2]-[3].
50
Id. The Uniform Rule Against Perpetuities Act is also incorporated in the
Uniform Probate Code § 2-901(a)(2) (1990).
51
For example, the rule has been abolished or severely limited in its operation in
Alaska, Arizona. Colorado, Delaware, D.C., Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine,
Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming. For a full discussion of the
legislative changes in these jurisdictions see Dukeminier and Krier, supra. note 48
at 1311-1316.
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perpetuities.” 52 Whether out of disinterest in the regulation of perpetual
trusts or perhaps even a desire for their existence, the primary rule
constraining the time frame for the vesting of future interests has simply
slipped out of fashion.
There are a variety of good reasons for abolishing the rule - it is
antiquated, 53 complicated, 54 ineffective, harmful, and unfair. 55 Many of
these arguments are not new. Strong opposition to the continuance of the
rule was voiced at least fifty years ago. 56 And yet the movement to abolish
it seems to have picked up steam in just the last few decades. Stewart Sterk
argues that in the United States the sudden race between jurisdictions to
abolish the rule, at least as it applies to trusts, stems from the generationskipping transfer tax enacted by Congress in 1986, combined with other
changes exposing lawyers to liability for failure to properly apply the rule.
He states, “Lawyer self-interest joined tax avoidance as a reason to abolish
the Rule.” 57 Even jurisdictions that have opted for retaining the rule, have
nonetheless considerably limited its application. The consequence has been
steep rise in the creation of perpetual trusts. The late Professor Jesse
Dukeminier reports that the “number of perpetual trusts created nationwide
now runs into the thousands per year.” 58
The recent history of the rule in the United Kingdom is instructive.
Considering its “complexity and harshness” the rule underwent a first
round of reforms in The Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964. The
most significant reform arising out of that Act was the adoption of a “wait
and see” approach. 59 More recently, the Law Commission has suggested
another set of reforms, most significantly that the rule be limited to
“successive estates and interests in property and to powers of appointment”
52

Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, Or the RAP has No
Friends – An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 603-604 (2000).
53
See Leach supra. note 35 at 39(“The Rule persists in personifying itself to me as
an elderly personage clothed in the dress of a bygone period …).
54
See Dobris, supra. note 52 at 656.
55
See The Irish Law Commission Report, supra. note 35. (Discussing all of these
objections – and more).
56
Leach supra. note 35. See also Dukeminier and Krier, supra. note 48 at 13041311(discussing the extended campaign to abolish or reform the rule).
57
Sterk, supra. note 44 at 2101.
58
Dukeminier and Krier, supra. note 48 at 1316.
59
For a summary of this and other changes see The Rules Against Perpetuities and
Excessive Accumulations, Law Commission Report 251 §2.13 (1998). The UK
Government accepted the report but has yet to pass legislation implementing its
objectives. See The Law Commission Annual Report 2006-07 p.16 http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc0607/hc05/0552/0552.pdf .
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leaving such rights as options and rights of pre-emption untouched by the
rule. 60 Additionally, the Law Commission has proposed that the perpetuity
period be replaced with a fixed 125-year term. 61 While it is plausible to
argue that this and other fixed term amendments to the rule actually shorten
the required time frame for the vesting of remote interests, it is equally
plausible to argue that they are longer than a “life in being plus twenty-one
years.” Furthermore, the fact that a “wait and see” provision typically
accompanies a fixed term amendment leaves the final disposition of remote
interests unsettled indefinitely.
It is worth noting that the “death” of the rule is only the latest in a
long drawn out eradication of rules designed to limit or control the creation
of non-vested future interests. In the introduction to his classic treatise on
the rule, written in the latter part of the 19th century, John Chipman Gray
remarked, “originally the common law subjected [the creation of future
interests] to many restrictions, but that these restrictions have been
gradually so far removed that the rule against perpetuities is now almost the
only legal check upon the granting of future interests.” 62 If the rule is
indeed the last significant barrier against the remote vesting of future
interests, one is left wondering why we are so unconcerned about its slow
disappearance.
2. Servitudes in Perpetuity
One of the most dramatic shifts in property law in the past fifty
years has been the influence of environmental or ecological concerns.
Where development was once allowed to proceed regardless of the
environmental impact, environmental regulations now heavily limit the
extent and conditions of property development. One need look no further
than the growing body of U.S. Supreme Court Cases on the question of
what forms of regulation constitute “takings” of property for the purposes
of the Constitution to see the impact of such regulations on land use. Many
of the recent regulatory takings cases relate to some form of environmental
regulation. 63

60

Law Commission Report, supra at §§11.2.
Id. at § 11.7
62
Gray, supra. note 37 at 3 some of the other rules are the destructibility of
contingent remainders and the merger rule.
63
See eg. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886
(1992); Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council Inc v. Tahoe Regional Planning, 535
U.S. 302, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (2002).
61
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Given the constitutional tensions and difficulties created by
environmental regulations it is no wonder that one of the most important
and heralded developments has been the conservation easement. 64
Professor Julia Mahoney notes that the number of acres protected by
conservation easements “increased from 450,000 in 1990 to 2.6 million in
2000. 65 By the end of 2005 that number had increased to more than 6.2
million acres. 66 As a private property 67 based mechanism for the
preservation and conservation of property, many have sung the praises of
this relative newcomer to the property scene. 68
While it has been around for almost a century the conservation
easement has only recently become a significant tool in conservation and
has developed largely outside of the common law. 69 The common law, in
fact, jealously guarded against the adoption of new negative easements.
The conservation easement, as a negative easement with the benefit
typically held in gross, is particularly problematic. 70 The common law
blocked the growth of such restrictions on the use of land because they are
64

For a general definition of a conservation easement (or servitude) see
Restatement of the Law Third – Property: Servitudes § 1.6 (1) (“A Conservation
servitude is a servitude created for conservation or preservation purposes.
Conservation purposes include retaining or protecting the natural, scenic, or openspace value of land, assuring the availability of land for agricultural, forest or
recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural resources, including plant and
wildlife habitats and ecosystems, and maintaining or enhancing air or water quality
or supply.”)
65
Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on law and the Problem of the Future,
88 VA. L. R. 739, 742 (2002)
66
See Land Trust Alliance, 2005 National Land Trust Census Report (2005)
available at http://www.lta.org/census/. See also Nancy A. McLaughlin,
Conservation Easements: Perpetuity and Beyond, 34 ECOL. L.Q. 673, 675 n. 8
(2007)(noting that the number of acres covered by conservations easements is
even higher once one factors in land trusts that operate on a national level, such as
the nature conservancy.)
67
Although some have questioned the extent to which it is really private given its
dependence on public provided incentives. See Leigh Raymond and Sally K.
Fairfax, The “Shift to Privatization” in Land Conservation, 42 NATURAL
RESOURCES J. 599, 626-628 (2002)
68
See Mahoney, supra. note 65 at 743 (noting that conservation easements have a
significant list of supporters and very few critics).
69
But see Bennett v. Commissioner of Food and Agriculture, 576 N.E.2d 1365
(Mass. 1991)(declaring validity of agricultural-preserve easement at common law
on the basis that it is in furtherance of an important stated legislative goal)
70
Andrew Dana and Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common
Law, 8 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2, 12-17 (1989).
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not readily apparent, unlike the typical affirmative easement with its clearly
marked intrusion on the burdened property. 71 While the law of equitable
servitudes has ushered in an expansion in the permissible range of such
restrictions, particularly in the U.S., 72 such servitudes are generally subject
to a host of complicated requirements, making them not the most userfriendly form of property restriction.
Given the common law’s suspicion of new non-possessory
interests and dead hand control over property, conservationists turned to
legislatures to establish the conservation easement. In 1981 the Uniform
Conservation Easement Act was approved and since then over 40 states
have passed legislation largely based on it, thus permitting the creation and
subsequent enforcement of conservation easements. 73 Comparable
interests usually under the name conservation covenants have also emerged
in New Zealand, 74 Australia, 75 and Canada. 76
The merits of this approach to conservation are not the focus of this
commentary. Rather what is of interest to me is the latitude granted to
current property owners choosing to restrict their property through
conservation easements. As with the disappearance of the rule against
perpetuities and other related rules, these servitudes provide current owners

71

Early attempts by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to obtain nonpossessory
interests in land as a conservation tool were only marginally successful because
subsequent property owners were able to claim under the common law that the
restrictions were not binding beyond the contracting parties. Mahoney, supra. at
749; “The law has been very chary of creating any new negative easements” –
Phipps v. Pears, [1965] 1 Q.B. 76 (Lord Denning)
72
The most important addition is the recognition of covenants or servitudes
imposing positive obligations on the burdened property holder, such as monetary
payments. See Rudden, supra note 2.
73
Mahoney, supra. note 65 at 750.
74
Queen Elizabeth the Second National Trust Act 1977, s.22 provides for the
creation of “open space covenants” defined as a “legal agreement between the
National Trust and a landowner, protecting privately owned open space…
Covenants are registered against the title and are binding on all present and
subsequent owners or leaseholders. Most open space covenants are in perpetuity.”
(emphasis added) From the National trust web site,
http://www.nationaltrust.org.nz/covenants/index.html
75
See, eg. Victorian Conservation Trust Act 1972 s. 3A, providing for the creation
of a “conservation covenant” to be held by the Trust; Soil and Land Conservation
Act 1945 (WA) s. 30B; National Parks and Wildlife Act 1970 (Tasmania) s. 37B.
76
Conservation Land Act, RSO c. C28; Land Title Act R.S.B.C. 1979 c. 219 s.
215.
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with unprecedented powers to affect the management of the burdened
property indefinitely.
It is important to recognize that conservation easements are
permanent by design and many of the statutes that facilitate their creation
actually require that they be perpetual. 77 It is permanence, along with
significant tax advantages, 78 that makes them both unique and highly
desirable. And while the collection of common law remedies that are
available to remove or terminate servitudes may still be available, the terms
of the legislation as well as the nature of the easement itself render such
remedies ineffective. For example, the doctrine of changed circumstances
is designed to permit the termination of an easement should it no longer be
suitable given changes in the surrounding neighborhood. The application of
this doctrine to conservation easements is problematic because changes to
the surrounding environment are themselves reasons for the existence of
the easement. Professor Mahoney states: “changed conditions of the
neighboring land renders enforcement of the servitude all the more
important because the burdened parcel represents the final vestige of the
old landscape.” 79 So we are left with a situation in which the servitude is
explicitly defined as being permanent, the conditions for removal are very
limited and the easement holder, typically a non-profit conservation
organization or a government agency, has no real incentive to consent to
termination. 80
The popularity of the conservation easement has emerged in
tandem with a comparable development in the area of historic preservation.
Here permanent easements, again granted to not-for-profit or government
heritage organizations such as the Illinois Landmark Commission, are
granted to ensure that the heritage aspects of privately owned property are
preserved. The recent Restatement covering servitudes and the Uniform
Conservation Easement Act include preservation or heritage based
restrictions in their definitions. The Restatement defines preservation
purposes as including “preserving the historical, architectural,
archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.” 81 As with the
77

See, eg. CA Civil Code § 815.2(b).
McLaughlin, supra. note 66 at 688.
79
Mahoney, supra. note 65 at 778.
80
See Id. for a spirited discussion of the permanence of conservation easements
and the problems generated by this dead hand control. McLaughlin, supra. note
66 at 706-707 (arguing for a more cautious use of the perpetual conservation
easement given the long term difficulties they pose).
81
Restatement of the Law Third – Property: Servitudes § 1.6 (1), See Bagley v.
Foundation of Preservation of Historic Georgetown, 647 A.2d 1110 (D.C. 1994).
78
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conservation easement, the historic preservation easement is intended to
last in perpetuity or so long as its intended purpose can be met.
Of course the popularity of preservation and conservation
easements is part of a larger trend embracing servitudes. As gated
communities and condo developments continue to expand, 82 the complex
web of covenants and conditions controlling property thickens. These
restrictions often have no definite end date and yet it is important to
distinguish them from the conservation and heritage related easements
precisely because the latter forms of restrictions are specifically designed to
run in perpetuity with only marginal prospects of termination.

3. Perpetual Rights in Knowledge and Ideas
Perhaps the most interesting example of the temporal extension of
property interests is the increasing time frame for intellectual property
rights. Since World War II there has been a huge expansion in intellectual
property rights leading to what John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos have
labelled the “biogopolies” and “infogopolies” of the twenty-first century. 83
These sanctioned monopolies, with their lock on a vast array of knowledge,
are at the forefront of the global economy, and they continue to expand
through the international rules established under the Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (“TRIPS”). While the expansion
of patents and copyrights into new areas of knowledge 84 and information 85
has been central to the growing importance of intellectual property rights,
the time expansion is no less remarkable.
The most significant and apparent changes to the temporal
boundaries of intellectual property rights are in the area of copyright. The

82

According to the Community Association Institute, a sixth of the U.S. Population
now live in gated communities. The Economist August 30, 2001.
83
JOHN BRAITHWAITE AND PETER DRAHOS, INFORMATION FEUDALISM (2002.)
84
In patent law, the steady shift from a focus on mechanical processes to
biotechnology and more recently genetic engineering has fundamentally altered
patent law and exponentially increased the number of existing patents. See
BRAITHWAITE AND DRAHOS, supra. note 83 at 150-168.
85
While the expansion in copyright is less dramatic, the extension of copyright to
computer technology, particularly software has had a significant impact on the role
of copyright in controlling information. See Braithwaite and Drahos, supra. at 169186; Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 55 FLORIDA L.REV. 763 (2003)
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recent court battle in the United States over the Copyright Term Extension
Act 86 (“CTEA”) put the question of the appropriate time frame for
copyright directly before the U.S. Supreme Court. 87 While perpetual
copyright protection would indeed violate the Constitutional requirement
that exclusive rights be “for limited times”, 88 the majority found that the
term established in the CTEA was not perpetual and the appropriate nonperpetual term was a matter for Congress to decide. Writing in dissent,
Justice Breyer expressed concern that the most recent extension “make[s]
the copyright term not limited, but virtually perpetual.” 89 Later in his
opinion he suggests that the new copyright term would, if the vesting of
property were in issue, “violate the traditional rule against perpetuities.” 90
Aside from the question of constitutionality, the trend here is
obvious – in the past 30 years the copyright term has moved from a
maximum of 56 years (28 years from the date of publication, renewable for
another 28 years) 91 to an average of 95 years 92 creating what Professor

86

Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1998)(“CTEA”).
The CTEA was the fourth such extension in U.S. legislative history. The initial
copyright term established in 1790 was 14 years from publication, renewable for
another 14 years.
87
Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186, 123 S.Ct. 769 (2003); (upholding the
constitutionality of the CTEA, extending the duration of copyrights by another 20
years).
88
Constitution, Art 1, § 8, cl.8: “Congress shall have Power … To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Art, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” While
there was some debate in English law about the existence of common law
perpetual copyright, this view did not appear to take root in the United States. The
Continental Congress had no power to regulate in this area and most states simply
embraced the English limitations set forth in the Statute of Anne: “No state was
disposed to view copyright as creating a perpetual rights.” Edward C.
Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits and the
Intellectual Property Clause, 7 J. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY L. 315, 349 (2000).
And a little later, “What is clear is that both Pickney and Madison did not want a
perpetual copyright term but rather wanted something along the lines set forth in
the Statute of Anne, that is to say, a limited term.” Id. at 354.
89
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 242; 123 S.Ct. at 801.
90
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 257; 123 S.Ct. at 808.
91
This term was established in 1909: Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Ch. 320, §§ 23-24, 35
Stat. 1080-1081 and remained in place until 1976.
92
The new term established under the CTEA is from creation until 70 years after
the author’s death, estimated to produce on average 95 year copyright terms. 17
U.S.C. § 302(a).
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Peter Jaszi, refers to as perpetual copyright “on an instalment plan.” 93 And
from an economic standpoint the current copyright term “has nearly the
same present value as an infinite copyright term.” 94
In other areas of intellectual property the time extensions have not
been dramatic. In the area of patents, changes in U.S. law have extended
the patent term but only marginally. The original patent term was fourteen
years 95 and today it reaches up to twenty years in keeping with TRIPS. 96
Because of TRIPS, the same twenty-year term is now standard in many
jurisdictions. But large corporate patent holders, particularly
pharmaceuticals, have engaged in a number of tactics designed to further
lengthen patent rights. 97 Some of these have met with moderate success
while others are typically prevented if caught. Most blatant of these is
simply double patenting – successfully applying for another patent once the
first term has expired. 98 In the U.S. this was dealt a decisive even if
needlessly complex blow in the termination of Eli Lilly’s second Prozac
patent. 99 The other more successful extension tactic is the “evergreening”
93

Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REV. 299, 302 (1996)
(quoting his own testimony in The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995:
Hearings on S. 483 Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong. (Sept. 24,
1995)).
94
Brief of George A. Akerlof, et al, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Eldred v. Ahscroft, no. 01-618, 8 (U.S. Sup. Ct. filed May 20, 2002)(available on
Lexis at 2001 US Briefs 618)(arguing that extending the copyright term increases
the social cost of monopoly). For an economic argument in favor of indefinitely
renewable copyright, see William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely
Renewable Copyright, 70 U.CHI. L.REV. 471 (2003). In two separate articles,
Justin Hughes and Joseph Liu also argue that the length of the copyright term
might not be problematic if fair use and other public access rights are
strengthened over time. Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time 50 UCLA L. REV.
775 (2003); Joseph P.Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV.
409 (2002).
95
The fourteen-year term established in the 1790 Patent Act derived from the
English Statute of Monopolies. This term lasted until the Patent act of 1861 when a
seventeen-year term was adopted. It wasn’t until 1995 that this term was extended
to twenty years to bring the law in line with TRIPS. Patent Code § 154(a)(2).
96
TRIPS, Art. 33.
97
See generally, Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property
Rights: Has the Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?. 41(2) IDEA – THE J. OF
L. AND TECH. 227 (2001). It should be noted that in some jurisdictions
pharmaceuticals also have a five-year extension of the standard twenty-year term.
98
BRAITHWAITE AND DRAHOS supra. note 83 at 161.
99
Eli Lilly and Co. v. Barr Laboratories Inc., 251 F.3d 955 (2001); For a comment
on the complexities of this case see Hsin Pai, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs, inc.:
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of patents, a technique whereby pharmaceutical companies succeed in
patenting new formulations and applications of a drug. 100
Other intellectual property interests are typically less constrained
by specific terms. Trademarks, for example, are infinitely renewable
provided they remain in use - they are and have always been potentially
perpetual. 101 But again other changes within trademark law have made
perpetual trademarks more of a reality. The emergence of the “dilution
rationale” for trademarks and the passage of anti-dilution statutes have
given expanded scope to the notion of use. 102 The enforceability of a
trademark now depends more on the proprietary interests of the mark
holder, “the business reputation or … the distinctive quality of a mark…”
rather than the regulation of competition and the interests of consumers. 103
With the switch away from the interests of consumers to the property or
authorship of the mark holder comes the distinct possibility of longer, more
powerful and wide-reaching trademarks. 104
While these changes stop short of creating or endorsing perpetual
intellectual property rights, there is a definite trend toward the lengthening
of intellectual property rights, particularly in the area of copyright.
Furthermore, unlike the prior examples where property interests are
fragmented over time, intellectual property interests are monopolistic and
thus enable long-term exclusive control. As a consequence the economic
and societal effects of even a limited lengthening are likely to be
significant.
B. Retreating to the Past
While the above examples indicate that with respect to some forms of
property, property owners are increasingly able to control their property

The Muddling of Obviousness Type Double Patenting Doctrine, 42 JURIMETRICS
479 (2002).
100
All Things Considered: Drug Patents (NPR radio broadcast Nov. 28, 2000)
[hereinafter NPR, All Things Considered], available at 2000 WL 21472964.
Glasgow, supra. note 97 at 234 (discussing the extension of the Augnmentin
patent). See also David Pilling & Richard Wolffe, Drug Abuses, FINANCIAL TIME
(London), Apr. 20, 2000, at 20, referring to these as “submarine patents.”
101
See TRIPS art. 18 (“The registration of a trademark shall be renewable
indefinitely.”)
102
Federal Trademark Dilution Act (1995) 15 USC 1125(c).
103
ROSEMARY COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES, 7071 (1999).
104
Id. at 71.
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further into the future, so too can they reach further into the past to reclaim
property. In the first example, the revival of customary rights, distinct
groups have successfully retained rights to use privately held or otherwise
inaccessible property based on usage for “time immemorial.” In the second
example, prior owners are able to circumvent otherwise applicable
limitation periods to claim important cultural objects.
1. “Usage for time immemorial” – Customary Rights
While the concept of “customary rights” has always held a
cherished place in English law most commentators agree that, “until
recently, one could fairly characterize the U.S. judicial reception to custom
as a source of law as decidedly chilly.” 105 So among the many changes in
property law that run contrary to the common law’s abhorrence of
perpetuities, 106 the strangest must be the revitalization, albeit limited, of the
doctrine of custom in establishing public access to private property.
Customary rights in common law jurisdictions have their origins,
like so many other property doctrines, in England’s manorial and feudal
system. Rights claimed by individual tenants of a manor were recognized
so long as the tenants could prove that the custom in question ran as far
back into time as anyone could remember and was reasonable. 107 What
makes the doctrine of custom particularly interesting for the purposes of
this paper is that it recognizes an inalienable, unending interest in affected
properties, held by a specific, clearly identifiable segment of the public and
that it justifies such interest based on usage for as long as the memory
stretches. In this sense it depends on recognition running back in time and
then enforces the rights in question indefinitely into the future. John
Chipman Gray remarked, “it should be remembered that [customary rights]
cannot be released, for no inhabitant, or body of inhabitants, is entitled to
speak for future inhabitants. Such rights form perpetuities of the most
objectionable character.” 108
Aside from a general aversion to perpetual interests, “customary
105

David Callies, Custom and Public trust: Background Principles of State
Property Law?, SE18 ALI-ABA 699, 703 (1999).
106
[F]or courts of justice will not indulge even wills, so as to create a perpetuity,
which the law abhors: because by perpetuities … estates are made incapable of
answering those ends, of social commerce, and providing for the sudden
contingencies of private life, for which property was at first established … 2
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, Ch. 11, 173-174.
107
CAROL ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 123 (1994).
108
JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 586 (3rd ed. 1914).
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rights” were spurned in American law because of the factual requirement
that the custom be traced back to time “immemorial.” Such a concept has
little place in a nation where European colonization and the reception of the
common law are well within recorded public/legal memory. 109 The
inconvenience and uncertainty that customary rights create for settled
common law private property interests provide yet additional reasons for
rejecting them. 110
Nonetheless some U.S. jurisdictions have recognized the existence
of customary rights. 111 In 1969 an Oregon court relied on customary rights
to recognize a public right of access to the dry sand area of private
beachfront property. The court stated: “It seems particularly appropriate in
the case at the bar to look to an ancient and accepted custom in this state as
the source of a rule of law.” 112 To support the idea of usage for time
immemorial, the court turned to evidence of Native American use of the
dry sand area long before European colonization.
Some American courts have rejected the notion of custom as an
“archaic judicial response” relying instead on the less “fixed or static”
concept of “public trust.” 113 Interests held under the public trust doctrine
also may run indefinitely and thus can be seen as part of the rise of
perpetual interests, although in a more limited way. Property interests held
through the concept of public trust depend on proof of public need whereas
the doctrine of custom primarily depends on continuity in the mere
recognition of the rights in question, not usage or need. 114 Property
109

See, eg. Ocean Beach Ass. V. Brinley, 34 N.J. Eq. 438; Harris v. Carson, 7
Leigh, 632 (va.)
110
Ackerman v. Shelp, 8 N.J.L. 125, 130-131 (1825).
111
Knowles v. Dow, 22 N.H. 387 (1859)
112
Thornton v. Hay, 462 P. 2d 671, 671 (Or. 1969).
113
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association, 471 A. 2d 355, 365 (N.J.
1984)(holding that the dry sand area of a beach owned by a quasi-public body was
open to the public through the public trust doctrine). The public trust doctrine as it
applies to beaches, tidal and submerged lands itself has a long history stretching
back at least to the 17th century and Matthew Hale’s treatise, De Jure Maris.
Within in the United States it has experienced surges of popularity since the early
19th c. See ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION, supra. note 107 at 115-116. The
modern articulation and application of the doctrine is typically traced to Joseph
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L.REV. 471 (1970). A brief history of the legal recognition
of public interest in tidal and submerged lands is also contained in Matthews, 471
A. 2d at 360-362.
114
See Callies, supra. note 105 at (around n. 26)(citing Blackstone for the
proposition that it is the right of use, not the use itself, that must be proven.).
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interests determined by public need are more changeable than those driven
by mere public recognition. Nonetheless the key advantage of both of these
approaches to the recognition of public access is that they steer clear of the
Constitutional requirement of compensation for a “taking” of property
because the public interest is presumed to have been there all along.
Private property owners lose nothing – a right to exclude the public was
never there to begin with. 115
Perhaps because of their ancient status and their strange
contradiction of common law property rights, customary rights have also
caught on in Hawaii where native Hawaiians have used them as the basis
for a variety of claims stemming from their traditional practices. For most
of its history as a state, the customary rights of native Hawaiians were
thought to be terminated by statute but in 1995 the Supreme Court of
Hawaii made it clear that such rights do exist and may trump common law
rights of exclusion. 116
Australian Aborigines and the Maoris of New Zealand have also
resorted to the notion of customary rights as a means of protecting their
traditional practices and ensuring access to private lands. 117 While this is a
contested innovation of the original English doctrine, it fits well with the
experiences of these indigenous populations. Unlike the European
populations that colonized these nations, the indigenous populations can
trace their usage back for “time immemorial.” Furthermore, the doctrine
was intended to apply to only specific communities and discrete practices,
making it peculiarly apposite to the situations of these peoples. So
customary rights have been widely used outside of the United States as a

115

This is a particularly convenient method of avoiding the possibility of
compensation in the wake of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council given its
stated exception for states’ “background principles of property law.” 505 U.S.
1003, 11020-32 (1992). However Justice Scalia, the author of the Lucas opinion,
has rejected the notion that such “new-found” doctrines are part of the
“background principles”. Stevens, 114 S.Ct. 1332, 1335 (1994)(denying cert.,
Scalia dissenting). For a discussion of whether customary rights are part of such
“background principles” see Callies, supra. note 105.
116
Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v. Hawaii County Planning Council, 903 P.2d.
1246 (Hawaii 1995); But see Hawaii v. Hanapi, 970 P 2d. 485 (Haw.
1998)(doubting the applicability of customary rights to settled residential property)
117
The Australian case law is probably the most extensive on the issue of
customary rights and “native title”: see Mabo v. Queensland (No.2) [1992] HCA
23. More recently the Australian High Court has begun to limit the rights
associated with “native title”: see Yorta Yorta v. Victoria, [2002] HCA 58.
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tool for the recognition of aboriginal rights. 118
There are a number of plausible explanations for why customary
rights have reappeared in case law. In the context of beach access,
customary rights can establish public access over a large area and against
an entire category of property-owners without running afoul of the
Constitutional requirement of compensation. In the area of aboriginal
rights, the striking suitability of customary rights to the indigenous
populations living within legal systems that offer very little else in the way
of remedies, goes a long way to explain their popularity. 119 But regardless
of the explanation, it is evident that customary rights have arisen “phoenixlike” 120 from the remains of English property law providing yet another
example of property interests running in perpetuity.
2. Stolen Cultural Objects and the Irrelevance of Limitation Periods
The restitution of personal property within the common law has
always turned on the applicable limitation period. While neither a thief nor
subsequent good faith purchaser can acquire good title to stolen objects, the
passage of a statutory time period, typically anywhere from two to six
years in U.S. jurisdictions, bars the original owner from claiming the
property in question, at least as against a good faith purchaser. 121 The
consequence is that a good faith purchaser of personal property typically
can feel secure about her title after the statutory time period for recovery
has expired. This, however, is no longer the case when dealing with
significant works of art or other cultural objects. Now it is possible for
owners to reclaim such objects long after the passage of the relevant time
period. 122
Changes in this area are related to two larger social/historical
concerns. The first is the Nazi theft and illegal transfer of a significant

118

See Kent McNeil, The Relevance of Traditional Laws and Customs to the
Existence and Content of Native Title at Common Law in EMERGING JUSTICE?
ESSAYS ON INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN CANADA AND AUSTRALIA 416 (Kent McNeil
ed., 2001). Kent McNeil, Self-Government and the Inalienability of Aboriginal
Title, 47 MCGILL L. J. 473 (2002).
119
Callies, supra. note 105 at (just after note 140 in conclusion).
120
Id.
121
See Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37 BUFF.
L. REV. 119 (1988/89).
122
See Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of
Cultural Property in the U.S., 75 B.U. L. REV. 559 (1995).
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portion of Europe’s artistic treasures. 123 Given the scale of Nazi looting
and the broader context of the Holocaust, it is not surprising that the
standard adverse possession approach was eventually found to be
unsuitable. 124 The first such case to deal with the issue in the U.S., Menzel
v. List, concerned the ownership of a Chagall painting left behind in
Belgium as the owners fled from the advancing Nazis. 125 The relevant New
York statutory time period had long since expired but the court permitted
the plaintiff to sue for the return of the painting through applying what is
now known as the “demand and refusal” rule. Under this rule the cause of
action does not accrue, and thus the limitation period does not begin to run,
until the original owner demands return and the defendant refuses. 126 While
subsequent cases raised some doubts about the continued application of this
rule, the New York Court of Appeals eventually affirmed it in Guggenheim
Foundation v. Lubell, 127 a case involving another Chagall.
Other courts dealing with ownership disputes over stolen or
missing art have followed New York’s lead and developed similar
approaches to the tolling of statutory limitation periods. Most significantly
the New Jersey courts developed what is known as the “discovery rule” in
O’Keeffe v. Snyder. 128 Under this approach, the cause of action does not
accrue and thus the statute of limitation does not begin to run until the
original owner has discovered the whereabouts of the stolen work,
provided that she has used due diligence in her search. The discovery rule
was also followed in a case involving Byzantine mosaics stolen from a
Greek Orthodox church in Turkish occupied Cyprus. 129 The “discovery
rule” was also the inspiration for a statutory provision in California dealing
with the recovery of stolen art. 130
123

See LYNN NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPA: THE FATE OF THE EUROPE’S
TREASURES IN THE THIRD REICH AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1994).
124
For a general discussion of the litigation surrounding Nazi looted art, see David
Wissbroeker, Six Klimts, a Picasso and a Schiele: Recent Litigation Attempts to
Recover Nazi Stolen Art, 14 DEPAUL-LCA J. OF ART AND ENTERTAINMENT L. 39
(2004); Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Reconciling Individual and Group Justice with
the Need for Repose in Nazi-Looted Art Disputes, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 155 (2007).
125
Menzel v. List, 22 A.D. 2d 647; 253 N.Y.S. 2d 43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964).
126
Id.
127
77 N.Y. 2d 311 (1991).
128
416 A.2d 862 (1980).
129
Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg, 717 F.Supp.
1374 (1989).
130
Ca. Code of Civ. Pro. § 338(c)(stipulating that the cause of action for the
recovery of art and other related material does not accrue until the discovery of the
whereabouts of the work in question).
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In addition to these various judicial innovations, museums and
governments around the world have initiated policies and guidelines
designed to encourage and in some cases dictate the return of looted art to
its original owners. 131 The American Association of Museums Guidelines
are typical in that they encourage members to “waive legitimate legal
defenses” to claims for recovery of once-looted art works in order to
achieve an “equitable and appropriate resolution of claims.” 132 Many of
these efforts have occurred in just the past decade following a sensational
standoff between the City of New York and an Austrian art foundation over
two Egon Schiele works that were apparently stolen by the Nazis. As a
result of these many efforts, an increasing number of looted works have
been and continue to be returned to their pre-World War II owners. 133
While these developments are an important piece of a larger reconciliation
process with Holocaust victims it is important to note that they do
contradict settled law in both civil and common law jurisdictions.
The second major development concerns the return and protection
of the cultural property of indigenous peoples. The motivations behind
these repatriations are similar to those driving the return of Nazi-looted art,
most notably concerns about fairness, a desire to compensate for past
injustices, and collective guilt. 134 And the timing is also similar with the
repatriation movement picking up steam throughout the world in just the
past few decades. Australia, New Zealand and the United States all have
substantial laws dealing specifically with the cultural property of their
indigenous peoples. Canada has not relied on legislation but accomplishes

131

For a recent discussion of many of these initiatives See Paulina McCarter
Collins Has the “Lost Museum” Been Found? Declassification of Government
Documents and Report on Holocaust Assets Offer Real Opportunity to “Do
Justice” For Holocaust Victoms on the Issue of Nazi-Looted Art, 54 Me. L.Rev.
115, 140-150 (2002). For a look at all these various policies, see
http://www.comartrecovery.org/policies/established_list.htm
132
American Association of Museums (AAM) Guidelines Concerning the
Unlawful Appropriation of Objects During the Nazi Era, June 1998, sec. 4(f),
available at http://www.comartrecovery.org/policies/established_list.htm.
133
But see Jennifer Anglim Kreder, U.S. Museums' Use of Declaratory Judgment
Actions in Nazi-Looted Art Disputes, ART, CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS AND
HERITAGE LAW NEWSLETTER, International Bar Association Legal Practice 7-8
(October 2007) Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=999666 (Discussing
pre-emptive approaches by museums to secure title to disputed works of art).
134
See, Sarah Harding, Justifying the Repatriation of Native American Cultural
Patrimony, 71 INDIANA L.J. 723 (1997).
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repatriation through informal and voluntary mechanisms not unlike those
that are now encouraging the return of Nazi-looted art. 135
The primary American legislation dealing with repatriations is the
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”), 136
which requires federally funded museums to return cultural objects to
culturally-affiliated tribes. Given that most of the cultural objects in
question have been in the possession of non-Native Americans for over a
century, here again the return runs counter to the law of personal property
in that it ignores the passage of the relevant statute of limitations.
NAGPRA very specifically attempts to avoid the issues generated by the
background common law and limitation periods by stipulating that
museums do not need to return any objects for which they can prove a
“right of possession,” but this “right of possession” is itself narrowly
defined. 137 For this and other more politically motivated reasons museums,
despite their lack of enthusiasm for NAGPRA, have been cautious about
utilizing the “right of possession” defense.
Placing these changes in the context of the material above, we see
again the possibility of ownership interests extending beyond the
traditional temporal limitations imposed in property law. Changing
circumstances and our general intuition that claims weaken over time 138
have provided adequate justification for extinguishing rights over time but
these reasons no longer seem to hold sway, at least in the areas discussed
above. While it might be tempting to marginalize this particular
development as just another example of the growing influence of human
rights in Western legal systems these changes are also appearing in cases
that are removed from the troubling human rights contexts discussed above.
The O’Keeffe case in which the discovery rule was crafted had nothing to
do with Nazi atrocities or the misdeeds of colonialism. The same applies to
the Byzantine mosaics case. The California law mentioned above applies to
all stolen articles “of historical, interpretive, scientific or artistic
significance,” 139 not simply those associated with a human rights violation.
Undoubtedly these changes are connected to problems unique to
the art and cultural object market: the increasing importance of this market,
the simultaneous emergence of a thriving black market, archaeological
135

Tamara Kagan, Recovering Aboriginal Cultural Property at Common Law: A
Contextual Approach, 63 U. OF TORONTO FAC. OF L. REV. 1, 12-14 (2005).
136
25 U.S.C. §§3001-3013 (1994).
137
25 U.S.C. § 3003(c); 3001(13). See Sarah Harding, Justifying the Repatriation
of Native American Cultural Patrimony, 71 Indiana L.J. 723, 736-737 (1997).
138
RUTI TEITEL TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 138 (2000).
139
Ca Code of Civ. Pro. § 338(c).
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looting, cultural misappropriation, and more generally the relative ease
with which art objects can be concealed. But these peculiarities should not
divert our attention from the temporal consequences - individuals or groups
are able to reclaim property long after their interests would have been
terminated under traditional common law and legislative rules.
C. Conclusion
The five examples discussed above may seem isolated and random
but they generate a few key observations. First, they stretch across all
formal categories of property law – real, personal, intellectual and cultural
property. Customary rights and conservation easements are changes with
respect to land; changes to the running of limitation periods in reclaiming
art and cultural objects obviously fit within the law of personal or cultural
property; and the intellectual property changes speak for themselves. The
Rule Against Perpetuities applies to most forms of non-vested property
interests. So while these examples might seem random or even in some
cases peripheral, alternatively we might see them as distinct niches in each
area of property where perpetual interests are permitted to thrive.
Second, the changes with respect to the conservation easement, the
Rule Against Perpetuities and the copyright term are not in the least bit
insignificant. The increasing number of acres subject to conservation
easements is ample evidence of the significance of this new form of
environmental protection. In former times the Rule Against Perpetuities
loomed large in the law of property. Its long standing in the law has made it
difficult to push aside; both its tenacity and the extensive discussion and
debate around its removal indicate that its withering is anything but
insignificant.
The changes to the copyright term along with the broader growth
of intellectual property rights are indisputably significant giving rise to
volumes of commentary and scholarship. Whether one bemoans or
applauds the increasing propertization of knowledge and information
through, among other mechanisms, term extensions, it is difficult to deny
the significance of intellectual property rights in the global economy. As
Saul Levmore remarked in a brief article on the future of property “of
course it is … ideas … which we can expect to come into play and to
dominate our economy – and interest group activity – in the future.” 140
Third and finally, the temporal changes highlighted above have
occurred through both judicial and legislative innovation. The more
140

Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. OF CHI.
L. REV. 181, 194 (2003).
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significant changes, those that have permitted property holders to extend
their claims further into the future, have been achieved through legislation.
But the innovative revival of customary rights, the development of the
public trust doctrine and the inventive interpretations of the tolling of
limitation periods in disputes over cultural objects indicate some openness
on the part of the judiciary to tinker with temporal limitations.
III. TIME AND THE CHANGING CULTURAL LANDSCAPE OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY
A. Everything but Time
It is possible to come up with entirely separate explanations for
each of these changes, explanations that may in fact contradict rather than
complement each other. But if we look at these various developments
through the lens of time, we see a pattern that deserves some attention. The
pattern or simple story that we could extract from all these examples might
go like this. Within many discrete areas falling under the broad umbrella of
property law, private (or even quasi-public) property holders are
increasingly capable of maintaining interests in their property for longer
periods of time. While perpetual interests have been a deep and abiding
concern in property law for much of its history, we no longer seem to care
that much about them. In short we seem less concerned about limiting
one’s control over or claim to property, to a specific and generally limited
time frame.
In most, but not all of the examples above, the expanded time
frame also introduces more complexity and uncertainty into private
property through either permitting the long term fragmentation of title, as
in the case of the conservation easement, or creating uncertainty about
future and current holdings, as in the case of the changes to the rule against
perpetuities and the recovery of stolen cultural property. While the
lengthening of intellectual property rights do not present the same type of
concerns, the long term monopolies created by such interests give rise to
other well-documented efficiency problems. 141
These changes are all quite remarkable given the common law’s
traditional abhorrence of perpetual interests, not to mention its general
preference for rules that encourage efficient use of property. So why are we

141

Brief of George A. Akerlof, et al, as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, no 01-618, 8 (USSC filed May 20, 2002).
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suddenly more willing to accept perpetual and fragmented property
interests?
1. Rent Seeking
One plausible explanation for this increasing temporal
permissiveness can be found in a cynical or “skeptical” 142 law and
economics story. Such an approach might explain these changes as the
products of classic rent seeking behavior, the sort that is ubiquitous in the
evolution of property rights. Accordingly, temporal changes might be the
result of individuals seeking profits or advantages associated with the use
and control of property, advantages that tend to leave society worse off
when it comes to net social wealth. After all individuals have always
desired perpetual interests in property 143 and historically it was the courts
and legislatures that limited such behavior through the establishment of
various temporal and conceptual boundaries. 144 In the various examples
discussed above, rent-seeking works through an official change in the rules,
rather than working within established rules, as would be the case of a
holdout. 145 So in addition to the rent seeking behavior this explanation also
requires hypothesizing capture of the legislative or judicial process by the
rent seeking individuals. 146

142

Levmore supra. note 140 at 182-183.
For a wonderful look at the persistent rent seeking of copyright and patent
holders attempting to secure perpetual rights, see Edward C. Walterscheid,
Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits and the Intellectual
Property Clause 7 J. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY L. 315, 334-340; 368-371 (2000).
144
Although early in the development of copyright Lord Mansfield suggested that
there was a perpetual property right based on the common law, a right that, if it
truly existed, was restrained by legislation, not the courts. See Walterscheid, supra.
note 143 at 334- 346 (discussing this history of the development of the first
English copyright statute, the Statute of Anne 1710, and subsequent debate over
its interpretation and background rights).
145
For a brief discussion of rent seeking both within the established rules and with
the intent of changing rules see, Thomas Merrill, Rent Seeking and the
Compensation Principle, 80 NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 1581, 1586-1587 (1986);
for a more general discussion see G. Tullock, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in
TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (J. Buchanan, R. Tollison &
G. Tullock eds. (1980).
146
See Peter Drahos, Regulating Property: Problems of Efficiency and Regulating
Capture, in REGULATING LAW 168 (Christine Parker, Colin Scott, Niki Lacey and
John Braithwaite eds. 2004) (Merrill too.)
143
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This may be a convincing explanation if we focus on the general
trend – individuals seeking greater control of their property over time. But
when we look closely at the examples it doesn’t always fit. Certainly rentseeking behavior is a plausible explanation for the changes to the RAP 147
and the lengthening terms in intellectual property rights. Peter Drahos and
John Braithwaite convincingly argue that this is the most compelling
explanation for the general expansion of intellectual property rights in
international law. 148 But it is less persuasive when we turn to the other
examples. Profit-driven or self-interested motives can certainly be read into
any of the above examples but such motives don’t always provide the most
convincing explanation for the changes. The conservation easement, for
example, presents the possibility of an interesting mix of selfish and
selfless motivations with tax advantages weighing in on one side and longterm environmental concerns on the other. Thomas Merrill argues that this
kind of legislation is “not easily placed under either the private-interest or
the public-interest model, but rather reflect widely shared moral or cultural
sentiments.” 149
The new rules regarding repatriation of cultural objects are equally
complicated in that they can certainly be understood as the triumph of
highly specified self-interested groups and yet the motivations here are best
understood in human rights or corrective justice terms, not profits. In short
not all of the changes have been driven by profit hungry individuals
desiring to make the most of their property and unconcerned about the
broader social impact.

2. Efficiency
The flip side of this “skeptical” rent-seeking story is the
“optimistic” economic story, developed most prominently by Harold
Demsetz in his immensely influential Toward a Theory of Property

147

See Dobris, supra. note 52 at 639-641 (arguing that while the Rule was
intended to benefit society over and above the preferences of individual
landowners, it demise is part and parcel of our lack of interest in civil society and
public life.)
148
See DRAHOS AND BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM, supra. note 83.
149
Merrill, supra. note 145 at 1587.
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Rights. 150 According to Demsetz, as the costs and benefits associated with
a specific resource change, property rights develop or change to produce
the most efficient outcomes (either in terms of incentive and production or
reduction of transaction costs). 151 This is one of the many stories that, for
example, intellectual property rights holders rely on to justify their
expanding rights, including term extensions: changes in technology and the
growing cost of research require longer lasting intellectual property rights
in order to maintain the optimal balance between incentives to create and
public access. 152 Indeed it can be used plausibly to justify any of the
changes even, according to Carol Rose, the rise of customary rights.
Customary rights fit within a group of resources cleverly labeled comedic
rather than tragic commons that become more valuable when more people
have access to them – “the more, the merrier.” 153
But if we are going to rely on this justification for changing
temporal limitations then we need to know what has changed such that
longer running property interests are more efficient, because in the past the
assumption has been quite the opposite. Indeed as was pointed out in the
above discussion of time and property, a recent wave of articles on the
numerus clausus in property has pointed to a raft of efficiency related
arguments for the existing temporal and conceptual limitations in
property. 154 More than two decades ago Robert Ellickson provided detailed
and convincing efficiency-based justifications for the rule against
perpeptuities, the rules allowing for the termination of servitudes and
shorter, not longer, limitation periods for adverse possession claims
(although he focuses on the adverse possession of land, not chattels). 155
The puzzle this poses should be obvious. If efficiency requires that
property remain flexible to enable appropriate responses to inevitable but
yet unidentifiable changes in market conditions, why are we witnessing the
rise of temporally unlimited property interests? If anything, the pace of
150

Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AMERICAN
ECONOMIC REVIEW 354 (1967).
151
Levmore, supra. note 140 at 182.
152
Although many are unconvinced that, at least in the area of copyright, longerlasting rights have any real impact on the incentive to create. See Brief of George
A. Akerlof, et al., supra. note 94.
153
Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce and Inherently
Public Property in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY
AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP (1994). Economists also refer to this phenomenon
as “network effects.”
154
See Supra. at notes 26-30.
155
Robert Ellickson, Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the
Libertarian Model of Property Rights, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 723 (1986).
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change in our current social and economic conditions would seem to dictate
shorter rather than longer running property interests. In short either the
efficiency argument simply can’t provide a compelling explanation for
these temporal changes or at the very least we need a richer analysis of the
effects of the quickening pace of change to provide the contextual
framework for a convincing efficiency-related argument.
3. Neoliberalism
A more persuasive explanation might be found in the rise of
neoliberalism. Given that most of the temporal changes, in particular those
that allow the running of perpetual interests into the future, can be
understood as expansions of property rights, we could think of these
changes as part and parcel of the swing away from Keynesian economics
and towards greater reliance on the market and private mechanisms of
control. Under such a theory there is a presumption against any rules that
interfere with ownership or create restraints on alienation, including
temporal limitations. Richard Epstein is arguably one of the most wellknown advocates of a neoliberal theory of property rights 156 and so it
should come as no surprise that he has argued against some of the temporal
limitations or constraints in property law.
In a now somewhat dated but nonetheless strikingly relevant
article, Epstein argues that the only justification for interfering with
“restraints of private alienation is to prevent the infliction of external
harms.” Since, according to Epstein, the rule against perpetuities “and its
kindred rules” are not directed to such harms, they serve no useful
legitimate function. 157 In short, Epstein argues for temporally unrestrained
ownership rights, at least with respect to attempts to control property in the
future.
Whatever one thinks of the normative argument here this
explanation at least has the virtue of fitting in with other current trends in
property law. In this sense we can understand the temporal changes as yet
another aspect of our steady move away from a centralized, “command and
control” model of the regulation of resources to rising confidence in a

156

See, RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
157
Richard Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of
Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 705 (1986).
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robust, unrestrained system of private property. 158 This trend is evident in
everything from the general privatization of world economies to the rise of
gated communities 159 and the emergence of market-based private property
solutions to resources formally considered public goods, such as clean
air. 160 This explanation, like the “optimistic” economic story, sees the
decreasing significance of temporal limitations as an intentional and
desirable development rather than just a case of the fox guarding the hen
house. But unlike the efficiency justification, unfettered private ownership
under this approach is presumed to be more than just productive. It is seen
as inherently more desirable because it is a fundamental element of one’s
right to property.
Despite the fact Epstein argues in favor of the rules of adverse
possession, including a standard application of limitation periods, he does
so on predominantly utilitarian terms, a theoretical shift for which he was
roundly criticized. 161 If we stick with the neoliberal approach the rights of
an original property-holder arguably take priority over all subsequent
illegitimate claims regardless of the concerns about efficiency or certainty
that are addressed by limitation periods destroying a right of recovery. 162
But even if we settle on this explanation we are still left with the
nagging question why have these absolutist tendencies with respect to
158

Carol Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 130 (1998); See also
ANTHONY GIDDENS THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 164 (1990).
159
See EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE
OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT (1996). (Maybe add Shearing on “Mass
Private Property”)
160
Rose, The Several Futures of Property, supra. note 158.
161
See Ellickson, supra. note 155; (Radin critique too).
162
Indeed there is some movement in this direction with respect to the adverse
possession of real property. In 2005 the European Court of Human Rights held
that the law of adverse possession in the United Kingdom violated the protection
of property found in the European Convention on Human Rights. The case
involved a very simple case of adverse possession with the usual mix of common
law elements and a statutory limitation period. The Court concluded that the
transfer of property without compensation to the adverse possessor violated the
plaintiff’s right to “peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.” J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd.
V. The United Kingdom, no. 44302/02, ECHR 2005-II. Public outcry at the effects
of adverse possession here in the United States have also led numerous states to
propose changes to the law of adverse possession, in some cases prohibiting it all
together. See Jay Romano, Adverse Possession: Mind Your Property, Real Estate,
New York Times, November 11. 2007; Heath Urie, Adverse Possession Bill Set
for Senate Committee, Boulder Daily Camera, March 4, 2008 (online edition).
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property rights materialized or surfaced in the areas discussed?
Furthermore arguably some of the changes are strikingly redistributive in
nature and as such sit uncomfortably with Epstein’s neoliberal approach. 163
This is most apparent in the re-emergence of customary rights, the publictrust doctrine and repatriation schemes.
4. Certainty, Fairness and the Changing Face of Property
There are a variety of other ideas we could explore. Perhaps the
changes reflect the simple reality that people live longer, or maybe the
general decline in the significance of tangible property in a global
economy. 164 We live in an information society, dependent on intangible
rather than tangible assets. If tangible property is unimportant, the rules that
have been put in place to ensure socially beneficial uses will presumably
also be of less importance. Setting aside the intellectual property material,
some of the changes involve rather remote examples of tangible property
that arguably have little to do with the economy and overall public welfare.
Even the rule against perpetuities, with its roots in an era when land was
the core of both social and economic life, is typically associated with land
rather than the vast and diverse types of property interests to which it in
fact applies. 165 But this doesn’t explain why intellectual property rights are
also getting longer. If all this turns on what is relevant to the growing
global economy and we accept the economic arguments for temporal
limitations, perhaps intellectual property rights should be getting shorter, or
at least not expanding.
It may also be the case that all these changes are simply part of the
cyclical movement in property between clear or “crystal” rules, devoted to
creating certain and definitive property rights, and fuzzy or “mud” rules
163

However Epstein has argued that long-standing public rights in property are
equally worthy of defense against the onslaught of legislation that might alter them
without compensation. So, for example, Epstein rejects the extension of the
copyright term as a legislative intrusion on existing public rights. Richard Epstein,
Congress’ Copyright Giveaway, Monday Dec. 21 1998 Wall Street Journal A19;
Epstein, The Dubious Constitutionality of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36
LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 123, 127-128 (2002)
164
Gregory Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal
Culture, 66 NYU L. REV. 273, 333-335 (1991)(discussing the rise of “imaginary
property” or intangibles); DRAHOS AND BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM,
supra. note 83 at 198-99 (“wealth comes from controlling abstract objects”);
Heller, supra. note 2 at 1174 (tangible property at the core of property conceptions
but the locus of economic value has shifted to intangibles).
165
See, Dobris, supra. note 52 at 635-639.
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whose purpose is to inject an element of fairness. 166 Given that the
temporal changes tend to create greater uncertainty, could it be said that
these rules simply reflect the mud part of the cycle? If so can we expect
these changes to be followed by a new set of doctrines that re-impose
clarity and more precise time frames for control over property? While we
may very well witness a swing back to the enforcement of temporal
limitations, I am not sure the “mud” explanation is entirely adequate in this
context. Not all the rule changes discussed above, particularly the changes
to the rule against perpetuities and intellectual property rights, are fuzzy,
mud kind of rules. To the contrary these changes simplify the rules of the
game, arguably bringing more certainty to what counts as a viable property
interest even if, as in the case of the rule against perpetuities,
simultaneously encouraging greater fragmentation of those interests.
So far this paper has presented a rather eclectic selection of
reasons, both normative and descriptive, for the slow disappearance of
temporal boundaries. All of the ideas presented above are worthy of further
discussion and are potential candidates for both exploring and critiquing
temporal changes. Some combination of these explanations may be the
most convincing and productive line of inquiry. But all of these approaches
suffer from a significant shortcoming. Each and every one of them fails to
deal directly with the temporal element. In each of the above justifications
temporal limitations and their removal are secondary issues, simply byproducts of larger normative theories or social expectations. In short, time
wouldn’t matter much if we were to pursue any of the above ideas. But if
we take seriously the growing acceptance of perpetual property and
Greenhouse’s observations about the importance of time in legitimating
law then curiosity compels a search for something that looks more
seriously at the temporal element.
This doesn’t mean that the above explanations are irrelevant or
unpersuasive. To the contrary, temporal limitations appeared because of
their tendency to encourage efficient and fair uses of property, not out of
opposition to perpetuities per se. And so it may very well be the case that
these same reasons have, in conjunction with changing cultural
assumptions about property, prompted the removal of such limitations. But
it is the changing cultural assumptions part of this - how we define fairness
and expectations through time - that is worth exploring.
166

Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STANFORD L. REV. 577
(1988). (arguing that both types of rules are present in property law and in fact
tend to appear in cyclical fashion, reflecting two important yet not wholly
compatible cultural tendencies in the maintenance of a system of private property –
desire for certainty on the one hand and fairness on the other).
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B. Time, Stability and the Subjective Element in Property
The new value placed on the transitory, the
elusive and the ephemeral, the very
celebration of dynamism, discloses a longing
for an undefiled, immaculate and stable
present. 167
The circumstances that created our current market-driven system of private
property and the temporal boundaries that go along with it seem not to have
changed dramatically. In particular the demands of social, commercial and
private life shift so rapidly today that we would expect there to be even
more limited temporal boundaries in the ownership of property. The
prevailing conditions of society even a single generation into the future are
likely to be so different from today that long-term control of property
seems anachronistic. Professor Mahoney captures this in her discussion of
the conservation easement: “there is a certain irony in the fact that the
number of acres under conservation easement has been growing rapidly at a
time when old conceptual models of natural and cultural stability have
begun to give way to more dynamic ones.” 168 Why is it the case that at
least in the limited areas discussed above, we strive for greater permanence
and long-arm control over property when our current cultural conditions
require greater flexibility? How is it that in an era of rapid technological
change we are more willing to tolerate perpetual property interests?
If we put the notion of time front and centre what becomes most
obvious is that the temporal expansion of interests in property has occurred
under broader social conditions of what David Harvey has termed “timespace compression.” Harvey uses this concept to elaborate on changes in
how we represent the world to ourselves. At its core it is simply an
articulation of the rapid acceleration of the pace of life and the
167

Jurgen Habermas, Modernity: An Incomplete Project, in POSTMODERN
CULTURE, 1 at 5 (H. Foster ed., 1985).
168
Mahoney, supra. note 65 at 753; see also Dan Tarlock, Slouching Toward
Eden: The Eco-Pragmatic Challenges of Ecosystem Revival, 87 MINN. L. REV.
1173 (2003)(discussing the changing approaches to environmental protection, in
particular the shift from a focus on preservation to revival); See also Alex
Geisinger, Rethinking Risk-Based Environmental Cleanup 76 INDIANA L.J. 367
(2001)(critiquing the “new cleanup paradigm” that restricts property use by
predicting and then entrenching future property uses).
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corresponding shrinking of space. Spatial barriers disappear as goods,
information and people move rapidly from place to place. Revolutionary
changes in transportation and communication technologies have radically
reduced both spatial and temporal horizons. 169
These changes are most apparent in the flow of capital and the
globalization of markets, but their effects are wide-ranging. Of these effects
or consequences the most evident “has been to accentuate volatility and
ephemerality” 170 in just about every aspect of life – the notion that “all that
is solid melts into air has rarely been more pervasive.” 171 Actual tangible
things pass through our hands with amazing speed generating labels such as
the “throwaway” or “disposable” society. These observations are hard to
reconcile with the changes in property law discussed above but the
transitory nature of current social conditions and all that surrounds us is
only part of the story. Harvey goes on to state:
But as so often happens, the plunge into the maelstrom
of ephemerality has provoked an explosion of opposed
sentiments and tendencies. . . . The revival of interest in
basic institutions (such as the family and community),
and the search for historical roots are all signs of a
search for more secure moorings and longer-lasting
values in a shifting world. 172
It is here in this oppositional tendency that we might find fertile
ground for exploring the temporal changes in property. Accordingly our
increased tolerance for perpetual property interests might reflect our desire
for stability, permanence, and historical continuity when such things are
scarce in other aspects of our lives. As Susan Stewart notes, within cultures
defined by an exchange economy, saturated with fungible commodities, the
search for something authentic and unchanging seemingly becomes
critical. 173
This explanation begins to look stronger when we take another
look at the areas where the temporal changes have occurred. Each of the
areas discussed concerns either institutions or actual objects to which we
tend to attach added personal, cultural or communal significance. The
clearest example of this is in the area of cultural property. The cases and
169

DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITIONS OF POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE
ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE 240 (1990).
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Id. at 285.
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Id. at 286.
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Id. at 292.
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SUSAN STEWART, ON LONGING: NARRATIVES OF THE MINIATURE, THE
GIGANTIC, THE SOUVENIR, THE COLLECTION 133 (1993).
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occasionally statutes are full of comments about preserving the past and
protecting sacred connections. As Harvey recognizes certain objects
“become the focus of a contemplative memory, and hence a generator of a
sense of self that lies outside the sensory overloading of consumerist
culture and fashion.” 174 Thus we have the meteoric rise of the market in art
and collectibles; this has been a reliable place to “store value
effectively.” 175 Even the conservation easement can be seen as a reflection
of our desire for permanence, an “undefiled, immaculate and stable
present.” 176
The idea that our concerns about protecting the past and preserving
our place into the future become more intense during times of technological
change is not just a product of our current conditions. Stephen Kern writes
about similar experiences in an earlier generation: “From 1880 to the
outbreak of World War I a series of sweeping changes in technology and
culture created distinctive new modes of thinking about and experiencing
time and space.” 177 This was a generation that looked to the past for
“stability in the face of rapid technological, cultural and social change.” 178
It was during this time that England, France and Germany all passed
legislation creating organizations such as the National Trust “to look after
places of historic interest or natural beauty.” 179
The temporal changes in the area of intellectual property can also
be viewed in this light but admittedly only indirectly. On the one hand the
changes to the copyright term seem most convincingly to be about profits,
whether rent-seeking or efficient, and the need to harmonize U.S. law with
the European copyright term (again for profit motivated reasons). And yet
it was arguments and concerns about incentives, creativity, the sanctity of
the creative product, the preservation of cultural heritage and the
importance of protecting the expectations of heirs that tended to pave the
way for expansion. 180 Disney was perhaps the most vocal special interest
174

HARVEY, THE CONDITIONS OF POSTMODERNITY, supra. note 169 at 292.
Id. at 298.
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Habermas, supra. note 167 at 5.
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Id. at 36.
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Id. at 39.
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See testimony of Jack Valenti before the Senate Judiciary Committee: “A public
domain work is an orphan. No one is responsible for its life. But everyone exploits
its use, until that time certain when it becomes soiled and haggard, barren of its
previous virtues.” Statement of Arthur R. Miller, Commentary, Extending
Copyrights Preserves U.S. Culture, Billboard, 1/14/95 (included in the
Congressional Record. A summary of all the Congressional testimony can be
found at
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advocate of the CTEA and yet its prominence in the debate over such
legislation did not focus on profits but rather concerns about defiling those
quintessential American cultural icons, Mickey and Minnie. 181
Despite the variety of situations governed by the rule against
perpetuities, its primary association is with the passing patriarch, the
testator who wants only to see that his lifelong efforts are not squandered
and that those he loves are well-cared for. It is fundamentally about ties to
family and community – those institutions, according to Harvey, that we
are striving to reinvigorate. The whole idea of dead-hand control is to
maintain some persistent presence among kin long after all physical traces
have disappeared.
So while there are multiple plausible explanations for why
temporal limitations are disappearing in some areas of property law,
equally plausible is the idea that some areas are perceived as being more
important to personal and cultural identity and as such are more susceptible
to claims about the importance of permanence and preservation. Because of
this perception, whether real or imaginary, we let our guard down and
ignore the significance of boundaries and rules that have been put in place
to protect broader social interests. We are quick and eager to buy into the
story of the struggling self - the struggling creator, the patriarch who just
wants to care for his family, the victims of ethnic and cultural genocide
wanting to reclaim something of their own, the environmentalist or public
advocate looking to preserve a little of the past for the generations of the
future – because it resonates with our personal experiences and our own
desire for stability.
In short if property law has been shaped by both subjective
preferences and objective rules based on broader concerns about social
utility, we might see the changes discussed as a leaning toward the
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/CT
EALegislativeHistoryOutline.html.). See also Senate Judiciary Committee Report
104-315, 104th Congress, 2d Sessions, July 10, 1996 (detailing concerns about
incentives for creativity and protecting claims for iconic works still popular and
profitable).
181
Rarely is there a mention of the CTEA in the popular media without reference
to the expiration of copyrights on Mickey Mouse and his friends. See, e.g. Linda
Greenhouse, Justices to Review Copyright Extension, NEW YORK TIMES (February
20, 2002)(mentioning the concern about Mickey Mouse entering into the public
domain). For more material see the documents and articles referenced at
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/commentar
y.html and
http://homepages.law.asu.edu/~dkarjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/legislative.h
tml.
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subjective preference side of the equation. While it is plausible that this
leaning stems from a growing acceptance of neoliberalism with its
emphasis on absolute property rights, it is equally plausible that such
changes simply reflect our yearning for enclaves of stability in the midst of
ceaseless flux. Furthermore, this approach, unlike the neoliberal claims,
helps explain the discrete nature of the temporal changes. While Epstein’s
approach would apply to all property interests, the arguments presented
here help explain only the limited areas discussed above or other areas
where we might recognize a significant cultural or personal element – areas
where it makes sense to seek greater permanence and stability.
This isn’t as far-fetched as it may sound. Emphasis on the
subjective element of ownership, the importance of imagination and
psychological attachments, has been a key element in property theory
going back at least to Hume who stressed the importance of conventions in
the construction of property rules. 182 More recently Erving Goffman’s
work showing that even under conditions of the starkest deprivation, we
strive to create property, enclaves of privacy and stable presence, often
appears in discussions of property. 183 Margaret Jane Radin is probably the
scholar most responsible for reinvigorating this aspect of property, drawing
out the personality element in property and the importance of this element
in the construction of legal rules relying predominantly on Hegel. 184 More
recently, Peter Benson has argued for a subjective, “self-authenticating”
element in principles of first occupancy. 185
Returning to Greenhouse’s observation about time and law, we
might say that the shift toward perpetual property reflects the “out of time”
aspect of law – a desire for constancy rather than the excessive flux
embedded in current conditions of the linear story. Surely the linear story is
till the predominant story in property law. The notion of private property is
fundamentally and intricately connected to our cultural obsession with
progress, growth and economic development. But integral to the mythic
status of law and property is the idea that there is always a permanent,
unchanging and impenetrable entitlement.
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Treatise on Human Nature, (“Of the origin and justice of property” and “Of the
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While a focus on the subjective element in property is not unusual I
have used it primarily as a descriptive tool leaving the larger normative
questions untouched. It is presented here as a plausible alternative to the
other strong contender for understanding these temporal changes, the one
suggested by Richard Epstein and actually argued for in temporal terms
almost twenty years ago. While Epstein’s approach would apply to all
property interests, the arguments presented here help explain only the
discrete areas discussed above. The recognition of a perpetual property
category whose perceived function at least partially is to provide greater
security in an ever-changing world, is arguably problematic not to mention
easily co-opted by rent seekers. But as a reflection of the larger social and
cultural responses to our current societal conditions it seems inevitable and
as such worthy of further attention.
Conclusion
Legally cognizable property rights are culturally contingent. Both
the scope and breadth of property rights has changed over time, driven by
the shifting needs and desires of individuals within society as well as the
erosion of some resources and the discovery of others. Ownership claims
or rights to property have been temporally circumscribed because such
limitations were necessary in agrarian/commercial societies but also
because the temporal boundaries served to legitimate the institution of
private property in terms that were socially cognizable. Such temporal
boundaries reflected the limits of fairness and effective management of
resources over time. In many ways these temporal limitations are more
important than ever and they persist in important ways. But with changes in
society, with the rapid pace and our constant state of flux, comes the
possibility of changing temporal limitations in areas where we might
logically seek refuge from the dizzy pace of life. Anthony Giddens
remarks, “where tradition lapses, and lifestyle choice prevails, the self isn’t
exempt. Self identity has to be created and recreated on a more active basis
than before.” 186 It is in this desire to recreate something personal,
meaningful and lasting that we can being to see the cultural legitimation of
perpetual property.
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